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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is currently classified as an anxiety 
disorder andis characterized by three main symptom clusters:re-experiencing an 
extremelytraumatic event, increased arousal, and avoidance of stimuli associated with the 
trauma (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000).Re-experiencing
symptoms generally include recurrent and intrusive recollections and dreams of the event,
intense negative psychological or physiological responses to trauma cues, and flashbacks 
(Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004).Avoidance symptoms include efforts to avoid 
thoughts and feelings associated with the traumatic event,activities, places or people that
are reminders of the traumatic event, difficulty remembering important parts of the 
traumatic event,and decreased capacity to experience certain feelings (Foa, Riggs, 
&Gershuny, 1995). Symptoms of hyperarousal generally includesleep difficulties, 
irritability or outbursts of anger, difficulty with concentration, and feeling constantly on 
guard and being easily startled (Woodward, Murburg, &Bliwise, 2000).
Flashbacks in PTSD
Among the three main symptom clusters, re-experiencing is the most frequently
endorsed PTSD symptom (Durham, McCammon, & Allison, 1985). Re-experiencing 
symptoms also occur immediately after a trauma (Eberly, Harkness, &Engdahl, 1991), 
which may lead to the development of other symptom clusters, including avoidance and 
2hyperarousal. For example, the intense emotions and physical reactions associated with 
re-experiencing may take the form of hyperarousal that reinforces avoidance of trauma 
reminders(Steil& Ehlers, 2000).A wide range of situational cues can easily trigger re-
experiencingand subsequent avoidance can significantly interfere with normal 
functioning (Ehlers, 2010). Re-experiencing symptoms can also be difficult to treat given 
that they are often fixed and difficult to modify even with corrective information 
(Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005). 
The term ‘flashbacks’ is often used to refer tothe sensory-based intrusions that are
characteristic of re-experiencing symptoms in PTSD.Sensory-based intrusions in PTSD 
can take different forms, including visual images as the most common, followed by
sounds, smells, tastes or bodily sensations(Ehlers, Hackmann, Steil, Clohessy, Wenninger, 
& Winter, 2002). Flashbackshave been defined as a dissociative re-living of the traumatic 
situation as if the traumatic event were recurring (Axmacher, Do Lam, Kessler, & Fell, 
2010; Falsetti, Monnier, Davis, &Resnick, 2002). Flashbackshave great perceptual detail
(e.g., sensory and movement information), and are accompanied by primary emotions of 
fear, helplessness, and horror that were experienced during the trauma itself
(Hellawell&Brewin, 2002a). However, flashbacks generallylackcontextual information
and their contents are experienced as isolated and disconnected from the present.As a 
consequence, flashbacks appear disjointed from other relevant autobiographical 
information (Ehlers et al., 2004). 
Although flashbacks represent a significant component of re-experiencing, they 
only capture lifelike perceptual features. PTSD patients also report intrusive thoughts 
(Ehlers et al., 2002).Intrusive thoughts are lexical cognitions that fall into three categories: 
3thoughts about threat and danger; negative thoughts about the self; and thoughts about the 
meaning of the event (De Silva & Marks, 1999). The content of intrusive thoughts 
consists of not only a recollection of the trauma event itself, but also rumination and 
evaluative thoughts about the trauma, such as attributions and appraisals, which 
alwaysfocus on experiences surrounding the traumatic event and trauma 
sequelae(Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004).Compared to flashbacks or 
sensory-based intrusions, intrusive thoughts are less commonly reported (Ehlers et al., 
2002) and have not been studied as much. Previous PTSD research often investigateda 
certain form of intrusions, either flashbacks or intrusive thoughts. In order to provide a 
broader understanding of re-experiencing, the present study directly examined both 
sensory-based intrusions and intrusive thoughts. Below, the term “intrusions” is used to 
describe both of them.
Memory Systems and Trauma-Related Memory
A better understanding of intrusions may be facilitated by consideration of the
research on memory retrieval. Broadly speaking, memorymay be retrieved via two 
processes: generative retrieval and direct retrieval. Generative retrieval is a top-down 
process through which the desired memory is intentionally retrieved. In contrast, direct 
retrieval refers to the retrieval of a specific memory when event-specific knowledge is 
activated by cues in the environment (Sumner, 2012). Similarly, trauma-related memory 
can be accessed via two processes. Intrusions can be retrieved involuntarily in an 
uncontrolled and unintended manner in response to situational cues, whileintentional 
4recall of trauma can be retrieved voluntarily and intentionally in a controlled and goal-
directed manner(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
Several theorists have argued that voluntary access to the trauma memory is 
impaired, whereas involuntary access is enhanced in PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Laposa& Rector, 2012).This idea is consistent with the common observation that patients 
with PTSD report a high frequency of involuntarily triggered intrusions in a vivid and 
emotional way (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003). In contrast, several studies have 
found that PTSD patients have deficits in intentional memory recall, including 
fragmentation and poor organization, missing details, and difficulty in reproducing the 
exact temporal order of events (Amir, Stafford, Freshman &Foa, 1998; McNally, Litz, 
Prassas, Shin, & Weathers, 1994; Moore &Zoellner, 2007). In one study, McNally, 
Lasko, Macklin, and Pitman (1995) found that individuals with PTSD were less specific 
than those without PTSD in their recall when asked to generate a memory in response to 
a cue word. One reason for this deficit is that resource-consuming processes such as 
intrusions and avoidance may interfere with effortful retrieval of specific memories
(Williams, 1996). Given that a portion of working memory is allocatedto intrusions and 
avoidance, limited executive resourcesmay lead to less coherent, more repetitive, and 
more disorganizedintentional recall of trauma(Brewin, 2007;Jones, Harvey, &Brewin, 
2007).
Models of PTSD have attempted to explain the apparent discrepancy between 
difficulties in intentional memory recall and easily triggered re-experiencing of the 
traumatic event (Moore &Zoellner, 2007;Williams, 2006). One view is that voluntary 
versus involuntary remembering may reflect the operations of two distinct memory 
5systems or fundamentally different processes (e.g., Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000). One prominent theory, the dual representation theory (DRT; 
Brewin et al., 1996),suggests that there are two types of memory representations of 
trauma (Brewin, 1989). One representation isthe situationally accessible memory (SAM 
system), which may be accessed automatically in situations similar to the traumatic event. 
The other representation,the verbally accessible memory (VAM system), is the person’s 
conscious experience of trauma that can be deliberately retrieved.The DRTpositsthat 
sensory, physiological, and motor aspects of the trauma, includingspontaneous intrusions 
that are dissociated from context,are represented in the SAM system; whereas 
autobiographical memoriesthat can be verbally communicated and deliberately recalled 
are represented in the VAM system. Although the two memory systems operate in 
parallel, they may manifest independently of each other (Brewin, 2003). For example, 
trauma may diminish neural activity in anatomical structures serving conscious 
processing and enhance activity in structures serving nonconscious perceptual and 
memory processes (Jacobs &Nadel, 1985). Therefore, trauma may facilitate the 
development of sensory-based intrusions throughthe SAM system, and less trauma-
related memoriescan be integrated into overall autobiographical memory through the 
VAM system. The two memory systems may also have some implications for the 
treatment of PTSD. For example,focusing and maintaining attention on the content of the 
sensory-based intrusionspresent in the SAM system, rather than avoiding them, may 
allow for the assignment of a spatial and temporal context to these intrusions that can be 
re-encoded into the VAM system.
6Although the underlying tenets of the DRT model of PTSD remain largely 
untested, it represents an initial attempt to understand the mechanisms through which
voluntary and involuntary trauma memories are developed. Some studies have been 
conducted to investigate how the two memory systems – SAM and VAM - operate during 
traumaby employing a dual task paradigm (Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, &Holmes, 2010; 
Hellawell&Brewin, 2002a). The dual task paradigm examines the extent to which 
performance on a basic primary task of interests is impaired when it is performed 
simultaneously with a second task, compared to a situation when the primary task is 
performed alone. Reductions in performance on the primary task reflect the extent to 
which the two tasks are in competition for the same underlying cognitive resources 
(Hellawell&Brewin, 2002b). In analogue PTSD studies, development of trauma-related 
memory after exposure to trauma stimuli is considered the equivalent of the primary task; 
whereas a cognitive task is considered a second taskcompeting for the same resources. 
The development of trauma-related memory would be impaired when the second task 
relies on the same processing resourcesused for encoding, consolidation, and/or retrieval 
of traumatic memories.For instance, a visuospatial task requiring processing via a 
perceptual memory system would compete for the resources in the SAM system. In turn, 
perceptual information related to trauma would be less well encoded, leading ultimately 
tofewer sensory-based intrusionsthan a no-task control condition (Brewin& Holmes, 
2003). In contrast, it has been hypothesized that a verbal task would compete for the 
resources in the VAM system and thus lead to a less-detailed representation of trauma-
related memory. This would result in moresensory-based intrusions relative to a no-task 
control condition(Brewin& Holmes, 2003).
7To test these hypotheses based on the dual task paradigm, several studies have 
been conducted to explore whether in fact secondary visuospatial and verbal tasks affect 
the retrieval of trauma memories in the manner predicted by Brewin and Holmes (2003). 
Thoughthe DRT wasintended to understand the development of trauma-related memory
in PTSD patients, intrusions do occur in the absent of PTSD in response to strong 
emotional events (Berntsen, 1996). Furthermore, the form of intrusions among those with 
and without PTSD is similar in nature(Ehlers et al., 2002; Michael et al., 2005). 
Accordingly, researchers have increasingly examined intrusions among healthy control 
subjectsas this may inform understanding of intrusions in PTSD.
In studies employing dual task paradigm, participantswatched a trauma filmand 
performed a visuospatial or a verbal task either during or after the film. They were then
asked to report their spontaneous memories of the film content via daily diaries recorded 
over the following week. One study showed thatplaying the visuospatially 
demandingcomputer game “Tetris”after viewing a trauma film,resulted in significantly 
fewer sensory-based intrusionsover a one-week periodcompared to a no-task control 
condition.Intentional memory recall of the trauma film was, however,intact (Holmes, 
James, Coode-Bate, &Deeprose, 2009). A recent extension of this work found that verbal 
interference (counting backwards in threes) during a trauma film resulted in more 
sensory-based intrusionsover a one-week period compared to a no-task control 
condition.In contrast, and consistent with the results of Holmes et al. (2009), participants 
who performed a visuospatial task (tapping a spatial pattern on a keypad) during the film 
demonstrated reduced sensory-based intrusions (Bourne et al., 2010). A recent study by 
the same research group also found that engaging in a visuospatial task four hoursafter a
8trauma film resulted in fewer sensory-based intrusions, whereas engagement in a verbal 
task resulted in more sensory-based intrusions(Holmes, James, Kilford, &Deeprose, 
2010).This line of research is consistent with the predictions of the DRT that visuospatial 
tasks attenuate the formation of sensory-based intrusions while verbal tasks have the 
opposite effects. In addition, these results suggest that various cognitive tasks may have 
an effect on the development of intrusions for up to 6 hours after trauma. Given that
memories are still largely malleable and sensitive to change,the consolidation of memory 
could be disrupted within a 6-hour period (Walker, Brakefield, Hobson, &Stickgold, 
2003). Therefore, one‘real world’ implication of this work is that engagement in 
visuospatial tasks withina few hours after a traumatic event may be employed to prevent 
the development of intrusions and subsequent PTSD. 
Although the findings that visuospatial and verbal tasks have different effects on 
intrusions are consistent with the predictions of the DRT, there are inconsistencies in the 
literature.For example, one study found that a peri-traumatic verbal interference task 
(counting backwards in threes) performed during a trauma film led to a decrease in 
sensory-based intrusions of the film compared to a no-task control condition (Krans, 
Näring, & Becker, 2009). Another study found that both visuospatial and verbal tasks
reducedsensory-based intrusions compared to a no-task control condition, but the two 
cognitive task conditions did not significantly differ fromeach other(Krans, Näring,
Holmes,& Becker, 2009).These findings seem to support a distraction hypothesis in
which any secondary task that requires processing resources can ultimately reduce 
intrusions (Gunter &Bodner, 2008). Consistent with this view, a recent study employing 
affective images as traumatic stimuli included two visuospatial and two verbal tasks 
9varying in cognitive load and found that both visuospatial and verbal tasks that are higher
in cognitive load reducedthe frequency of intrusions,but lower cognitive load tasks had 
noeffecton intrusions (Pearson & Sawyer, 2011). 
The inconsistent findings suggest thatthe effects of cognitive tasks on trauma 
memories may not be modality specific.Importantly, most studies do not match the 
visuospatial and verbal tasks in important dimensions which may partially account for 
findings showing predicted differences.Although visuospatial and verbal tasks may differ 
with regards to the memory systems that theyrecruit, it is important that they do not differ 
in other aspects, such as difficulty and engagement levels, when examined in the 
laboratory. Matching the two tasks on such dimensions will allow for ruling out the 
possibility that differences in intrusions are due to differences in cognitive load rather 
than the functional properties of the tasks. 
The DRT also predicts that intentional memory recallwould be impaired in a
verbal condition because less trauma-related memory can be processed in VAM due to 
the competition of a verbal task. In contrast,a visuospatial task would compete for the 
resources in the SAM system and perceptual information of trauma would be less well 
encoded. Thus,there would be fewer sensory-based intrusions developed, and more 
trauma-related memory can be integrated into autobiographical memory (Brewin& 
Holmes, 2003). However, a majority of studies have observed no differences in 
intentional memory recall between different cognitive task conditions (Holmes et al., 
2009; Holmes et al., 2010). The null findings of intentional memory recall are 
inconsistent with the DRT, and no appropriate interpretations have been provided in 
previous research (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009). One possibility is that null findings may be 
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largely due to limitations in the assessment of intentionalmemory recall in prior studies. 
The measuremost widely used was a true/false questionnaireprobing about specific 
occurrences in the trauma film employed in a study. Each item pertained to a specific 
trauma film clip (e.g., Three cars were involved in the crash) but the items used may not 
have probed sufficient details to provide an optimally comprehensive and sensitive 
measure of recall. Accordingly, the current study employed multiple approaches to more 
comprehensivelyassessing intentional memory recall and better examining the hypotheses 
of the DRT.
Overview of Present Study
According to the DRT,visuospatial tasks compete for the limited resources in the 
SAM system, leading to perceptual information being less well encoded and resulting in 
fewer sensory-based intrusions; in turn, the intentional recall of trauma memory is 
enhanced with more intrusions transferred and integrated into overall autobiographical 
memory. In contrast, verbal tasks compete for the resources in the VAM system, leading 
to a less-detailed conscious representation of trauma memory, and resulting in more 
sensory-based intrusions. However, findings along these lines have been far from 
consistent. In addition, the DRT did not state clearly about the development of less 
reported intrusive thoughts. A majority of empirical research only studied sensory-based 
intrusions, so the effects of cognitive tasks on intrusive thoughts remain unknown. 
According to the DRT, the major difference between the SAM and the VAM is whether 
trauma related memory can be retrieved involuntarily by situational cues or intentionally
in a controlled manner (Brewin et al., 1996). Similar to sensory-based intrusions, 
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intrusive thoughts can be activated and retrieved by situational cues, so they were 
assumed to be affected by cognitive tasks the same way as sensory-based intrusions. 
Because of the inconsistencies and lack of research on intrusive thoughts in the 
literature, the present investigation further examined the effects of visuospatial and verbal 
tasks on subsequent intrusions – sensory-based intrusions and intrusive thoughts - and 
intentional memory recall of trauma-relevant content. In the current study, the 
visuospatial and verbal tasks were matched in some essential aspects, such as 
engagement and difficulty, to better examine whether they have different effects on 
intrusions and whether the effects are due to the task modality. In the current study, the 
following hypotheses were examined:
After a visuospatial and a verbal task were matched in some essential aspects:
1. Engagement in a visuospatial task after viewing a trauma film would result in 
a reduction in intrusions over a one-week period relative to a verbal and no-
task control conditions.
2. Engagement in a verbal task would result in an increase in intrusions relative 
to a visuospatial and no-task control conditions.
3. Engagement in a visuospatial task would lead to better intentional memory 
recall than a no-task control condition and a verbal condition because fewer 
intrusions developed, and more intrusions would be integrated into 
autobiographical memory.
4. Engagement in a verbal task would result in worse intentional memory recall
than a no-task control condition and a visuospatial condition, given that verbal 
12
tasks interrupt the encoding of trauma memory processed consciously and 
verbally. 
CHAPTER II
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Seventy-three participants (78% female) were recruited from undergraduate 
courses at a Southern University in exchange for research credit. The ageof the sample 
rangedfrom 18 to 24, with mean age 19.37 (SD = 1.18). The sample consisted of66% 
Caucasians, 14% African Americans, 3% Latinos, 11% Asians, and 6% that endorsed 
“other”.
Measures
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977)
is a 20-item questionnaire ofdepressivesymptomson a Likert scale from 0 (“Rarely or 
none of the time”) to 3 (“Most or all of the time”). The CES-D had an alpha coefficient of 
.82 in the present study.
The Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007) is an 18-item 
questionnaire that measures fear of anxiety-related symptoms based on the perceptions 
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that these sensations have harmful consequence on three subscales: physical, social, and 
cognitivesubscales on a Likert scale from 0 (“Very Little”) to 4 (“Very Much”). The ASI-
3 had an alpha coefficient of .87 in the present study.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory- Trait Version, Form Y (STAI-T; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, &Lushene, 1983) is 20-item scale that measures the enduring or chronic 
experience of anxiety, on a Likert scale from 1 (“Almost Never”) to 4 (“Almost 
Always”). The alpha coefficient for the STAI-T was .86 in the present study. 
TheModified Version of the Differential Emotion Scale (MDES; Gross 
&Levenson, 1995) is to assess the intensity of subjective emotional arousal in eight 
emotion categories (i.e., amused, angry, contented, disgusted, fearful, disinterested, sad, 
and surprised).The participants were required to give ratings on a 9-point scale, from 0 
(“Did not feel the slightest bit of the emotion”) to 8 (“The most I have ever felt in my 
life”.)
The Impact of Event Scale - Revised (IES-R; Weiss &Marmar, 1997)is a 22-
itemquestionnaire assessingthe subjective response to a specific traumatic event on a 
Likert scale from 0 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Extremely”). The alpha coefficient for the IES-R 
was .90 in the present study. The instructions of IES-R were modified to fit the trauma 
film in the present study, so all of the symptoms participants reported were regardingthe 
trauma film, not their personal experiences. 
TheRecognition Memory Testis a 50-item scale developed for the present study to 
examine participants’ intentionalmemory recall of the trauma film in the present study. 
The testis comprised of 50 forced choice (yes/no) statements (25 are true and 25 are false; 
e.g. “The person who was hit in the street market was holding a blue umbrella.”). For 
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each video clip, there are two to three questions assessing participantsmemory of details 
in the clip. 
Trauma film
Participants were shown a 10 min film of graphic scenes of fatal road traffic 
accidents. The film consists of 20 separate scenes(Because not all the video clips have 
sound,the trauma film was presented without sound. Therefore, participants would not be 
biased towards video clips with sound or intrusions in the form of sound). The trauma 
film was displayed on a 17 inch flat computer screen. Participants sat approximately 
40cm from the screen. 
Cognitive Tasks
Visuospatial task. TheBenton judgment of line orientation test (JLOT; Benton, 
Hamsher, Varney, &Spreen, 1983) is a neuropsychological test widely used to assess 
visuospatial processing. It requires participants to identify the orientation of pairs of lines 
on a multiple-choice display, which consists of 11 numbered lines, each separated by an 
angle of 18˚ (Figure 1). The display was presented for 2 seconds before it went off, then a 
pair of lines from the display was randomly selected and presented for 2 seconds. After 
that, the participants saw the display again and responded with the numbers associated 
with the two lines presented earlier. The display and pairs of lines were presented in 
white on a black background and in the center of a 17 inch flat computer screen under 
normal room illumination, approximately 40cm from participants. The response time was 
not a criterion, so enough pair
this task for 10 minutes. 
Figure 1.the Benton Judgment of Line Orientation Test 
(number 5 and number 8) from the
Verbal task. The A
Examinations) were employed
which is most opposite in meaning to the word given
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s of lines were prepared to allow all participants 
- the display and a pair of lines 
display .
ntonyms and Analogiessections of the GRE (Graduate Record 
. Antonyms required participants to select a word or phrase 
[e.g., DIFFUSE: (a) concentrate (b) 
to perform
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contend (c) imply (d) pretend (e) rebel. Correct answer: (a)]. Analogies required 
participants to select a pair of words that best expresses a relationship similar to the pair 
of words given [e.g., color : spectrum: (a) tone : scale (b) sound : waves (c) verse : poem 
(d) dimension : space (e) cell : organism. Correct answer: (a)].Words in the verbal task 
were presented for 5 seconds before they went off, and then participants responded with 
the five options presented. Participants performed Antonyms for 5 minutes and Analogies 
for another 5 minutes. The words were in white on a black background and were in the 
center of a 17 inch flat computer screen under normal room illumination, approximately 
40cm from participants.
Daily Diary
Participants kept a daily diary for 1 week, in which they recorded and rated each 
of their intrusionsabout the trauma film in terms of how distressing each one was on a 0-
100 scale with 0 being “not at all” and 100 being “the most they could imagine feeling”. 
The definition of intrusionsand instructions were given on the front page of diary:
“In the following week, recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the 
videos you watched, including images, thoughts, or perceptions, may pop into 
your awareness, without any conscious, premeditated attempt to search and 
retrieve. These memories are called intrusions. I would appreciate if you could 
note them down in the diary. If you have several intrusions of the same thing, 
please write down every individual one when it happens.”
Procedure
After giving their informed consent, participants completed the CES-D, ASI-3, 
STAI-T, and MDES assessing depression, anxiety sensitivity, trait anxiety, and mood. 
They then watched the trauma film. After watching the film, they completed the MDES 
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againand then completed a filler task for 30 minutes that consisted of 20 minutes 
answeringtrivial questions, and 10 minutes of listening to music and givingratings to each 
music episode on how pleasant it was. The materials for the filler task were the same as 
those used in previous research by Holmes’s research group, (Holmes et al., 2009). Give 
that there is often a time delay between the experience of a traumatic event and treatment 
in the real world, the filler task was employed to allow for time between the trauma film 
and the cognitive tasks. After the filler task, twenty neutral but recognizable images from 
the twenty film clips were presented, in order to reactivate participants’ memories of the 
trauma film. The neutral but recognizable images were presented for two reasons: (1)The 
trauma film is not personally relevantand reactivating their memory may help prevent a 
floor effects should participants have few intrusions regarding the trauma film. (2)During 
the period between trauma exposure and intervention, survivors may re-experience the 
trauma event. Hence, presentation of images from the trauma film may be a good model 
for this experience.Participants were then randomized to avisuospatial condition (Benton 
judgment of line orientation test), a verbal condition (antonyms and analogies), or a no-
task control condition (sitting quietly). They were required to performone of the two 
cognitive tasks or sit quietlyfor ten minutes. Participants in the visuospatial and verbal 
conditions also rated the tasks on how difficult and how engaging they werefrom 0 (not at 
all) to 9 (the most ever). After ten minutes, all participants were instructed to report initial 
intrusions of the trauma film over the ten minute period, in order to further help them
understand the definition of intrusions and how to record their intrusions in the following 
week. An overview of the procedure was presented in Appendix 1. 
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Participants then kept a daily diary for one week, in which they recorded and 
described each of their intrusions. They returned the diary one week later and then 
completed the IES-R, theRecognition Memory Test, and provided a written description of 
their memories of the trauma film.
Results
Participant Characteristics
As shown in Table 1, there were no significant group differences ingender, 
ethnicity, or self-report measureson depression, anxiety sensitivity, and trait anxiety. 
However, participants in the control condition (M = 19.88) wereolder than those in the 
other two conditions[VS: M = 19.12, V: M = 19.13; F(2, 70) = 3.48,p< .05, partial 2
= .67]. Although the differences were not large in magnitude, subsequent analyses
included age as a covariate.
Table 1.Study 1group means (standard deviations)of measures among visuospatial, verbal, 
and control condition participants
Visuospatial 
(n=25)
Verbal 
(n=24)
Control 
(n=24)
p
Age 19.12 (1.05) 19.13 (.99) 19.88 (1.36) .04
Gender (%Female) 76% 88% 71% .36
Ethnicity (%Caucasian) 72% 63% 63% .50
CES-D 15.72 (8.18) 17.21 (7.55) 15.29 (8.53) .69
ASI-3 13.88 (11.12) 14.46 (7.57) 13.54 (10.36) .95
19
STAI-T 42.56 (8.86) 40.79 (8.28) 42.58 (8.53) .71
Mood Manipulation Check
Ratings for eachmood on the MDES weresubjected to a 3 (condition: visuospatial, 
verbal, and control) X 2 (MDES:pre and post trauma film) mixed-model ANCOVA, with 
age as a covariate.The significant main effect of time for each mood suggestedsignificant 
pre to post changes on the MDES. The analyses revealedparticipants were less amused
(F(1, 70) = 179.73, p< .001, partial 2 = .72), contented (F(1, 70) = 191.39, p< .001, 
partial 2 = .73), and disinterested (F(1, 70) = 140.97, p< .001, partial 2 = .67); and
more angry (F(1, 70) = 15.24, p< .001, partial 2 = .18), disgusted (F(1, 70) = 259.08, 
p< .001, partial 2 = .79), fearful (F(1, 70) = 163.77, p< .001, partial 2 = .70), sad (F(1, 
70) = 86.62, p< .001, partial 2 = .55), and surprised(F(1, 70) = 63.34, p< .001, partial 
2 = .48) after viewing the trauma film(Fig. 1). The analyses also showed significant 
main effect of condition on amused (F(2, 70) = 5.94, p< .05, partial 2 = .15) and 
contented (F(2, 70) = 7.51, p = .001, partial 2 = .18). Participants in the control 
condition were more amused and contented than those in the other two conditions before 
viewing the trauma film. However, these group differences were not significant after 
viewing the trauma film. 
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Figure 1. Effects of trauma film on mood in Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors.
Comparisons of theCognitive Tasks
As shown in Table 2, independent samples t-testrevealed no significant 
differences between visuospatial and verbal conditions in terms of subjects’ reports about 
task difficulty and engagement. 
Table 2. Task comparisons between visuospatial and verbal conditions in Study 1
Visuospatial 
(n=25)M (SD)
Verbal (n=24)M 
(SD)
t df p
Difficult 5.56 (1.47) 6.06 (1.56) -1.16 47 .25
Engaging 2.72 (2.03) 3.73 (2.47) -1.56 47 .12
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Effects of Cognitive Tasks on Intrusions
A 3 (Group) X 7 (day) univariatemixed-model ANCOVAwas employed to 
examine group differences in frequency of intrusions and in the pattern of decline in 
intrusions over the one-week period. According to Delaney and Maxwell (1981)’s 
recommendation for covariates in repeated measures designs, deviation of age from the 
grand mean across all the conditions was included as a covariate . The analyses showed
no significant main effect of group (F(2, 66) = 1.17, p> .05, partial 2 = .03) or 
interaction effect between group and day (F(12, 396) = .83, p> .05, partial 2 = .03), 
revealing no significant group differences in intrusions and similar patterns among the 
three conditions.The analysis showed a significant main effect of day (F(6, 396) = 29.93, 
p< .001, partial 2 = .31, and the three conditions did not differ in linear trend (F(2, 66) 
= .43, p > .05, partial 2 = .01) or quadratic trend (F(2, 66) = 2.13, p > .05, partial 2
= .06). Across the three conditions, there was alinear trend (F(1, 66) = 64.44, p < .001, 
partial 2 = .49) and a quadratic trend (F(1, 66) = 31.87, p < .001, partial 2 = .33) in 
the decline of intrusions, indicating the rate of decline was fast in the first few days, and 
then slowed down. Furthermore, ANCOVAs were conducted to examine group 
differences in intrusions within each day. The analyses suggested no significant group 
differences in intrusions in any day of the week (Day 1: F(1, 67) = 1.92, p > .05, partial 
2 = .05; Day 2: F(1, 67) = .29, p > .05, partial 2 = .01; Day 3: F(1, 67) = .76, p > .05, 
partial 2 = .02; Day 4: F(1, 67) = .59, p > .05, partial 2 = .02; Day 5: F(1, 67) = .70, 
p > .05, partial 2 = .02; Day 6: F(1, 67) = 1.45, p > .05, partial 2 = .04; Day 7: F(1, 66) 
= 1.58, p > .05, partial 2 = .05). 
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An ANCOVAwas also conducted to examine group differences in average 
distress ratings of intrusions. As shown in Table 3, no group differences emerged (F(2, 
60) = .19, p> .05, partial 2 = .01).
Table 3.Study 1group means (standard deviations)of dependent measures among 
visuospatial, verbal, and control condition participants
Visuospatial Verbal Control F p partial 2
Intrusions 7.67 (7.25) 5.96 
(6.99)
4.65 
(3.68)
1.17 .32 .03
Distress Ratings 32.22 
(13.77)
35.04 
(25.09)
33.64 
(17.97)
.19 .83 .01
IES-R 15.58 
(10.95)
14.83 
(12.81)
12.09 
(7.91)
.38 .69 .01
Intentional Memory Recall
(number of correct responses 
out of 50 items)
32.46 (3.58) 31.50 
(3.16)
31.26 
(3.24)
1.54 .22 .04
Written Memory 13.76 (7.47) 14.27 
(6.83)
14.40 
(9.09)
.21 .81 .01
23
Figure 2.Rate of change in frequency of intrusions across the three conditions in Study 1. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
Effects of Cognitive Tasks on Analogue PTSD Symptoms
Holmes et al. (2009) found that exposure to a visuospatial task after a trauma film 
led to fewer reported PTSD symptoms relative to a control condition. Therefore, an 
ANCOVAwas conducted to assess group differences in analogue PTSD symptoms as 
assessed by IES-R. As shown in Table 3, no significant group differences were found
(F(2, 67) = .38, p> .05, partial 2 = .01).
Effects of Cognitive Tasks on Intentional Memory Recall
An ANCOVAwas then conducted to examine group differences in intentional
memory recall on the Recognition Memory Test. Results in Table 3 showed no 
significant group differences (F(2, 67) = 1.54, p> .05, partial 2 = .04). Across the three 
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conditions, participants averaged 63.49% correct.One-sample t test showed that 
participants’ responses were significantly above chance level (t(70) = 17.10, p<  .001). 
Signal detection analyses revealed that the false alarm rate was .45 (a false alarm was 
defined as a false statement about the trauma film recognized as true) and that the false 
negative rate was .28 (a false negative was defined as a true statement about the trauma 
film was recognized as false). An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA, controlling for age) 
was then conducted to examine group differences in dprime (difference between hit and 
false alarm, indicating how sensitive participants are in deciding a true statement is true). 
There revealed no significant group differences (F(2, 67) = 1.13, p> .05, partial 2 = .03). 
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA, controlling for age) was also conducted to 
examine group differences in bias (indicating if participants are more often to respond 
with Yes or No), and revealed no significant group differences (F(2, 67) = 2.31, p> .05, 
partial 2 = .07). Moreover, participants’ written memory was rated by two coders, who 
were unaware of experimental conditions. The two coders followed the same guidelines 
and rated participants’ written memories on each video clip on a 0 – 3 scale, depending 
on if they remembered eachvideo clip and how much detail they can provide. The 
possible range was 0 to 60 across the 20 video clips.The inter-rater reliability was .90 and 
the final ratings were determined by averaging the two coders’ ratings. Examination of 
the ratings of written memory by ANCOVA revealed no significant group differences 
(F(2, 69) = .21, p> .05, partial 2 = .01).
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Correlations between Individual Differences and Dependent Variables
Given the absence ofsignificant group differences between visuospatial, verbal 
and control conditions on the primary dependent variables, exploratory correlations were 
computed to examine the associations between individual differences ondepression, trait 
anxiety, and anxiety sensitivity, and the dependent variables in this study, including 
intrusions, intentional memory recall, and PTSD symptoms.As shown in Table 4, anxiety 
sensitivity was more strongly correlated with PTSD symptoms and trauma-related 
memories than trait anxiety and depression. These associations remained largely intact 
after controlling for trait anxiety and depression. The associations between anxiety 
sensitivity and intrusions and intentional memory recall were most pronounced for the 
physical concerns subscale of ASI-3. Moreover, anxiety sensitivity was positively 
correlated with frequency of intrusions (r = .29, p< .05), but negatively correlated with 
intentional memory recall on the Recognition Memory Test (r = -.30, p< .05). 
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Table 4. Correlations (partial correlations) between individual differences and dependent 
variables in Study 1
Frequency of 
Intrusions
Recognition 
Memory Test
Rating 
Memory
IES-R
ASI-3 .29* (.29*) -.30* (-.25*) -.12 (-.15) .38** (.29*)
ASI-physical .32** (.32**) -.29*(-.26*) -.14(-.18) .29*(.19)
ASI-cognitive .21(.20) -.27*(-.22) -.12(-.15) .33**(.25*)
ASI-social .18* (.17) -.19(-.11) -.05(-.04) .30**(.23)
STAI-T .05 -.17 .08 .12
CES-D .07 -.17 .04 .28*
Note: *p< .05, **p< .01. 
Discussion
Inconsistent with predictions, the present study found no significant differences 
betweenvisuospatial, verbal, and control conditions in frequency of intrusions, intentional 
memory recall, or analogue PTSD symptoms.There were two major differences between 
Study 1 and studies conducted by the Holmes’ research group (for example: Holmes et 
al., 2009). One was the different visuospatial tasks: previous research employed the 
computer game “Tetris”, while the present studyemployed the Benton Judgment of Line 
Orientation Test. The other difference was that previous research only counted sensory-
based intrusions, whereas in the present study, both sensory-based intrusions and 
intrusive thoughts were included. To better understand whether only some specific
visuospatial tasks have impact on intrusions and whethersensory-based intrusions are
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more significantly influenced by visuospatial tasks, Study 2 was conducted to investigate 
the effects of “Tetris” on sensory-based intrusions relative to a no-task control condition.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Thirty-five participants (83% female) were recruited from undergraduate courses 
at a Southern University in exchange for research credit. The age of the sample 
rangedfrom 18 to 27, with mean age 19.66 (SD = 1.68). The sample consisted of57% 
Caucasians, 23% African Americans, 11% Asians, and 9% that endorsed “other”.
Measures
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977)from Study 1 was also used for Study 2. The alpha coefficient was.90in the current
study.
The Anxiety Sensitivity Index -3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007) from Study 1was also 
used for Study 2. The alpha coefficient was.92 in the current study.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory- Trait Version, Form Y (STAI-T; Spielberger et 
al., 1983) from Study 1 was also used for Study 2. The alpha coefficient was .94 in the 
present study. 
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The Impact of Event Scale - Revised (IES-R; Weiss &Marmar, 1997)from Study 1 
was also used for Study 2. The alpha coefficient for the IES-R was .92 in the present 
study.
TheModified Version of the Differential Emotion Scale (MDES; Gross 
&Levenson, 1995),and theRecognition Memory Testfrom Study 1 were also used in 
Study 2. 
Trauma film
The trauma film was the same as the one used in Study 1.
Visuospatial Task
The visuospatial task is a computer game “Tetris”, which is a tile-matching puzzle 
video game requiring mental rotation of shapes. The objective of the game is to 
manipulate shapes by moving each one sideways and rotating it by 90 degree units, with 
the aim of creating a horizontal line of ten blocks without gaps. Participants were show 
the website http://www.freetetris.org, and performed “Tetris” in the website. Participants 
can choose whichever level they feel comfortable with.
Daily Diary
In addition torecording and rating all the intrusionsabout the trauma film, 
participants were asked to make the distinction between sensory-based intrusions and 
intrusive thoughts for each intrusion. Instructions were given on the front page of the 
diary:
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“Intrusions are recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the videos you 
just watched, including images, thoughts, or perceptions, which may pop into 
your awareness, without any conscious, premeditated attempt to search and 
retrieve. Intrusions may take the form of mental pictures called “images”, or 
words and phrases called “verbal thoughts.Mental images actually include any of 
the five senses, so you can see, feel, smell, hear, and taste in the image. Verbal 
thoughts are when you’re thinking using words and silently talking to yourself, 
like an internal running commentary or dialogue. Here is the diary for you to 
record your intrusions in the next week. Please write down how many times you 
experience intrusions each day, what the content of each intrusion is, and if they 
are images, verbal thoughts, or both, and please also give a rating of how 
distressing each intrusion is.”
Results
Participant Characteristics
As shown in Table 5, there were no significant group differences in age,gender, 
ethnicity, or self-report measures before viewing the trauma film.
Table 5. Study 2group means (standard deviations)of measures among visuospatial and 
control condition participants
Visuospatial (n=17) Control (n=18) p
Age 19.53 (1.23) 19.78 (2.05) .67
Gender (%Female) 76% 89% .33
Ethnicity (%Caucasian) 65% 50% .47
CES-D 15.47 (10.01) 13.94 (9.57) .65
ASI-3 17.47 (15.78) 12.28 (7.44) .22
STAI-T 39.58 (11.52) 39.22 (10.70) .92
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Mood Manipulation Check
Ratings for eachmood on the MDES weresubjected to 2(condition: visuospatial 
and control) X 2 (MDES: pre and post trauma film) mixed-model ANOVA. The 
significant main effect of time for each mood suggested significant pre to post changes on 
the MDES. Follow-up analyses revealed participants were less amused (F(1, 33) = 
163.45, p< .001, partial 2 = .83), contented (F(1, 33) = 237.38, p< .001, partial 2
= .88), and disinterested (F(1, 33) = 150.75, p< .001, partial 2 = .82); and more angry 
(F(1, 33) = 15.24, p< .01, partial 2 = .24), disgusted (F(1, 33) = 105.95, p< .001, partial 
2 = .76), fearful (F(1, 33) = 143.88, p< .001, partial 2 = .81), sad (F(1, 33) = 51.46, 
p< .001, partial 2 = .61), and surprised (F(1, 33) = 44.33, p< .001, partial 2 = .57) 
after viewing the trauma film (Figure 3).
Figurer 3. Effects of trauma film on mood in Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Effects of the Visuospatial Task on Sensory-Based Intrusions
A 2 (Group) X 7 (day) mixed-model ANOVA was employed to examine group 
differences in frequency of sensory-based intrusions and in the pattern of decline over the 
one-week period. There was no significant main effect of group (F(1, 33) = .01, p> .05, 
partial 2 < .001) or interaction effect between group and day (F(6, 198) = .15, p> .05, 
partial 2 = .01), indicating no significant group differences in sensory-based intrusions 
and similar decline patterns among the three conditions. The analysis showed a 
significant main effect of day (F(6, 198) = 10.38, p< .001, partial 2 = .24). Across the 
three conditions, there was a linear trend (F(1, 33) =28.73, p < .001, partial 2 = .47) and 
a quadratic trend (F(1, 33) = 7.00, p < .005, partial 2 = .18) in the decline of sensory-
based intrusions, indicating the rate of decline was fast in the first few days, and then 
slowed down. ANOVAs were conducted to examine group differences in sensory-based 
intrusions within each day. The analyses suggested no significant differences in any day 
of the week (Day 1: F(1, 33) =.06, p > .05, partial 2 = .002; Day 2: F(1, 33) =.09, 
p > .05, partial 2 = .003; Day 3: F(1, 33) = .05, p > .05, partial 2 = .001; Day 4: F(1, 
33) = .08, p > .05, partial 2 < .002; Day 5: F(1, 33) = .10, p > .05, partial 2 < .003; Day 
6: F(1, 33) = .23, p > .05, partial 2 = .007; Day 7: F(1, 33) = .17, p > .05, partial 2
= .005). 
An ANOVAwas conducted to examine group differences in average distress 
ratings of sensory-based intrusions. As shown in Table 5, no group differences emerged 
(F(1, 29) = .34, p> .05, partial 2 = .01).
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Table 5.Study 2 group means (standard deviations)of dependent measures among 
visuospatial and control condition participants
Visuospatial
M (SD)
Control
M (SD) F p partial 2
Sensory-Based Intrusions 5.24 (4.89) 5.39 (4.18) .01 .92 .00
Distress Ratings of Sensory-
Based Intrusions
42.35 (23.15) 37.91 (18.87) .34 .56 .01
IES-R 19.35 (13.26) 18.00 (13.42) .09 .77 .00
Intentional Memory Recall
(number of correct responses 
out of 50 items)
33.18 (2.98) 33.17 (2.87) .00 .99 .00
Written Memory 15.44 (8.55) 13.11 (6.92) .77 .39 .02
Figure 4.Rate of change in frequency of sensory-based intrusions across the two
conditions in Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Effects of the Visuospatial Task on Analogue PTSD Symptoms
An ANOVA was conducted to assess group differences in analogue PTSD 
symptoms as assessed by IES-R. As shown in Table 5, no significant group differences 
were found (F(1, 33) = .09, p> .05, partial 2 = .00). There was no significant effect of 
visuospatial tasks on analogue PTSD symptoms compared to a control condition. 
Effects of the Visuospatial Task on Intentional Memory Recall
An ANOVA was conducted to examine group differences in intentional memory 
recall on the Recognition Memory Test. As shown in Table 5, there were no significant 
group differences (F(1, 33) = .00, p> .05, partial 2 = .00). Across the three conditions, 
participants performed 66.34% correct on average. One-sample t test showed that 
participants’ responses were significantly above chance level (t(34) = 67.00, p<  .00). 
Signal detection analyses revealed that false alarm rate was .43 (a false alarm was defined 
as a false statement about the trauma film recognized as true); and false negative rate 
was .25 (a false negative was defined as a true statement about the trauma film was 
recognized as false). An analysis of variance was then conducted to examine group 
differences in dprime. There revealed no significant group differences (F(1, 33) = .00, 
p> .05, partial 2 = .00). An analysis of variance was also conducted to examine group 
differences in bias, and showed no significant group differences (F(1, 33) = .51, p> .05, 
partial 2 = .02). In addition, participants’ written memory was rated by two coders, who 
were unaware of experimental conditions. The inter-rater reliability was .82 and the final 
ratings were determined by averaging the two coders’ ratings. Examination of the ratings 
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of written memory revealed no significant group differences (F(1, 32) = .77, p> .05, 
partial 2 = .02).
Correlations between Individual Differences and Dependent Variables
Given the absence of significant group differences between visuospatial and 
control conditions, an exploratory analysis was conducted to examine the association 
between individual differences in depression, trait anxiety, and anxiety sensitivity, and 
dependent variables of frequency of sensory-based intrusions, intentional memory recall, 
and analogue PTSD symptoms. As shown in Table 6, anxiety sensitivity, trait anxiety, 
and depression were all correlated to analogue PTSD symptoms. The associations 
between anxiety sensitivity and sensory-based intrusions and analogue PTSD symptoms
were most pronounced for the physical concerns subscale of ASI-3. These associations of 
anxiety sensitivity and analogue PTSD symptoms remained largely intact after 
controlling for trait anxiety and depression. However,after controlling for anxiety 
sensitivity, the associations of trait anxiety and depression and analogue PTSD symptoms 
were not significant. 
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Table 6. Correlations (Partial Correlations) between Individual Differences and 
Dependent Variables in Study 2
Frequency of 
sensory-based 
Intrusions
Recognition 
Memory Test
Rating 
Memory
IES-R
ASI-3 .26 (.16) .09 (.02) .33 (.33) .53** (.39*)
ASI-physical .37* (.33) .20 (.16) .32 (.31) .54**(.43*)
ASI-cognitive .16 (.06) .15 (.09) .27 (.25) .52** (.38*)
ASI-social .14 (-.12) -.10 (-.21) .27 (.24) .33 (.13)
STAI-T .21 .14 .12 .40*
CES-D .13 .12 .10 .40*
Note: *p< .05, **p< .01. 
Discussion
The results in Study 2 failed to showsignificant differences in sensory-based 
intrusions, intentional memory recall, and analogue PTSD symptoms between 
visuospatial and control conditions. Consistent with Study 1, anxiety sensitivity was more 
strongly correlated with analogue PTSD symptoms than trait anxiety and depression. 
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The DRTsuggested two types of memory representations of trauma – SAM 
system and VAM system (Brewin, 1989). Sensory, physiological, and motor aspects of 
the trauma, such as sensory-based intrusions are represented in the SAM system; whereas 
autobiographical memoriesthat can be verbally communicated and deliberately recalled 
are represented in the VAM system (Brewin et al., 1996).According to predictions based 
onthe DRT, a visuospatial task competing for resources in the VAM system shouldreduce
intrusions. In contrast, a verbal task should increase intrusions because it competes for 
the resources in the VAM system and leads to a less-detailed representation of trauma-
related memory(Brewin & Holmes, 2003).Inconsistent with these predictions, the 
findings of Study 1 revealed no significant differences in intrusions over a one-week 
period after watching a trauma film between visuospatial, verbal, and control conditions.
These findings are also inconsistent with previous research supporting the predictions of 
the DRT by showing that engaging in a visuospatial task reduced sensory-based 
intrusions and engaging in a verbal task increased sensory-based intrusions compared to a 
no-task control condition (e.g., Holmes et al., 2010). 
The inconsistent findings may be partially accounted for by differences in the 
visuospatial and verbal taskemployed. For example, the computer game “Tetris” (Holmes 
et al., 2009), tapping a spatial pattern on a concealed keypad (Bourne et al., 2010), or a 
trail-making task (Hellawell&Brewin, 2002a) has been the visuospatial taskemployed in 
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previous research. Furthermore, counting backwards in threes/sevens from a three-digit 
number (Bourne et al., 2010) or a verbal pub quiz (Holmes et al., 2010)has been used as 
the verbal task. In contrast, Study 1 employed the Benton Judgment of Line Orientation 
Test as the visuospatial task and the Antonyms and Analogiessections of the GREas the 
verbal task. The lack of group differences may be due to differentcognitive 
loadassociated with tasks. Cognitive load theory argues that cognitive capacity in 
working memory is limited.If a task requires too much capacity, a secondary taskwill be 
hampered(Chandler &Sweller, 1991). However, if a task comparably requires less
resource to process, the performance on the other task may not be significantly affected. 
Future research could compare cognitive tasks in the present study and those in prior 
research to examine whether low cognitive load of tasks contribute to the null findings.
It is also important to note that previous studies have generally failed to match 
visuospatial and verbal tasks on important dimensions.For example, visuospatial and 
verbal tasks may differ with regards to level of difficulty and engagement. Differences in 
intrusions may then be accounted for by differences associated withthe cognitive load of
the tasks rather than the task per se. To rule out this alternative explanation, Study 1 
matched the visuospatial task and the verbal task in difficulty and engagement levels.
However, no significant differences were observed between these two tasks. This lack of 
group differences confirms thatcognitive tasks matched in difficulty and engagement 
exert no different effects on intrusions because they may require similar amount of 
cognitive resources to process. This view is inconsistent with the predictions of the DRT, 
but may support a distraction hypothesis(Gunter &Bodner, 2008). Differences in 
intrusions may be due to distraction for general working memory resources but not the 
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nature of task.However, the distraction hypothesis still cannot interpret why there were 
no differences between cognitive task conditions and the control condition. It should be 
noted that the present study only matched cognitive tasks in respects of difficulty and 
engagement, future research where the cognitive loads of visuospatial and verbal tasks 
are systematically varied may highlight the parameters for which such tasks influence the 
development of intrusions. 
The inconsistent findings may also be partially accounted for by how intrusions 
were operationalized.Sensory-based intrusions are characterized by great perceptual 
detail. Intrusive thoughts are characterized primarily by rumination (Ehlers et al., 2002; 
Hackmann et al., 2004). According to the DRT, a visuospatial task would compete for the 
resources in the SAM system, leading to perceptual information being less well encoded. 
Therefore, sensory-based intrusions, but not intrusive thoughts, would be influenced by a 
visuospatial task because both of them are processed on a perceptual level (Brewin& 
Holmes, 2003). Indeed, previous research supporting the DRT only assessed sensory-
based intrusions (Holmes et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2010). One limitation of Study 1 is 
that sensory-based intrusions and intrusive thoughts were not differentiated, which may 
account for the null findings1.
Study 2 was designed to address some of the inconsistencies between Study 1 and 
previous research. Specifically, the visuospatial task Tetris that has been employed in 
prior research was used. Furthermore, only sensory-based intrusions were examined in
Study2. Despite these changes, no significant differencein sensory-based intrusions was 
                                                          
1The diary was subsequently coded by an experimenter that was blind to the two conditions for sensory-
based intrusions and intrusive thoughts. Examination of group differences on the sensory-based intrusions 
revealed no significant differences (F(2, 67) = 1.42, p> .01, partial 2 = .04). 
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found between participants in the visuospatial condition and those in the control 
condition. 
The present study further examined the rate of decline in intrusions between the 
three conditions. One prediction consistent with the DRT is that those in the visuospatial 
condition may experience a faster reduction in intrusions relative to other conditions. 
However, no significant differences in rate of decline were found in intrusions between 
the three conditions in Study 1 or sensory-based intrusions between the two conditions in 
Study 2. The overall trend across all the three conditions in Study 1 and the two 
conditions in Study 2 consistently revealed a steep decline in the number of intrusions in 
the first few days, followed by the frequency leveling off and remaining relatively low 
during the last few days. Consistent with prior research (Butler, Wells, &Dewick, 1995; 
Trinder&Salkovskis, 1994), the decline of intrusions over the one-week period may 
reflect a “natural recovery” (Foa& Cahill, 2001) where high levels of symptoms are 
common in the aftermath of a traumatic event, but symptoms tend to subside in the 
posttrauma period (Brewin, 2001). 
Reconciling differences between those of the present study and prior research 
supporting the predictions of the DRT may warrant consideration of the trauma stimuli 
employed. The trauma film in the present study was 20 episodes of car accidents. Prior 
research has used car accidents as trauma stimuli (e.g., Holmes, Brewin, &Henessy, 
2004). However, such studies often include a short commentary that provides a context 
for these accidents. Unlike the present study, other studies have employed a variety of 
events, such as car accidents, people drowning, and surgery as trauma stimuli (e.g., 
Holmes et al., 2009). The trauma films employed in this area of research clearly differ in 
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content, duration, and the degree to which it is based on a coherent theme versus a 
compilation of unconnected scenes. Although such differences in trauma stimuli may be 
expected to result in different distress reactions and subsequent intrusions, prior research 
suggests that this is not the case (Weidmann, Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, &Fydrich, 2009). 
Furthermore, previous research employing a variety of trauma films has shown that 
different cognitive tasks lead to differences in intrusions (Bourne et al., 2010; Holmes et 
al., 2004). Although the effects of cognitive tasks on intrusions appear to be independent 
of the trauma film employed, furtherinvestigation of the trauma film used in the present 
studyis needed to understand if the null findings can be partially accounted for by single 
type trauma presented or other characteristics of the film.
The present study also examined the hypothesis that intentional memory recall 
would be better in the visuospatial condition and worse in the verbal condition. 
According to the DRT, a verbal task interrupts the consciously and verbally encoding of 
trauma memory resulting inlesstrauma-related memory that can be intentionally retrieved. 
A visuospatial task, on the other hand, leads to fewer sensory-based intrusions, so more 
trauma-related memory can be integrated into autobiographical memory. However, the 
present studyfound no significant effects of cognitive tasks on intentional memory recall, 
a pattern of findings that is consistent withprior studies (Holmes et al., 2009; Holmes et 
al., 2010). A possible interpretation is that the measurement of intentional memory recall 
is not accurate or comprehensive enough to capture all the features of intentional memory 
recall of the trauma film. Although the current study included multiple assessments of 
intentional memory recall, other aspects including the temporal order (Ehlers et al., 2004) 
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and fragmentation and disorganization of the trauma(Foa& Riggs, 1993) may be more 
sensitive to differences in cognitive tasks. 
Prior research suggests that the DRT may also have implications for the treatment 
of PTSD. For example, Holmes et al. (2009) found that participants engaging in a 
visuospatial task after exposure to a trauma film reported less PTSD symptoms than those 
in the control condition. However, the present study found no significant differences 
between the three conditions in re-experiencing, avoidance, and hyperarousal symptoms 
as assessed by IES-R. The discrepancies regarding analogue PTSD symptoms between 
the present study and prior research were in accordance with findings of intrusions. Given 
that intrusions are one symptom of PTSD, future investigation is required to understand 
how different cognitive tasks interfere with the development of intrusions, and further 
with other PTSD symptoms.
The null findings of the present study are inconsistent with predictions derived 
from the DRT. A major assumption of the DRT is that SAM and VAM are two separate 
memory systems (Brewin et al., 1996). This assumption is consistent with a 
multicomponent model of working memory, which proposes two domain-specific storage 
subsystems for verbal and visuospatial information (Baddeley, 2000; Baddeley& Hitch, 
1974). Working memory is a system for the temporary storage and processing of 
information (Just & Carpenter, 1992). A key aspect of working memory is its capacity 
limitation, usually reflected in decreasing performance in response to increase in working 
memory load (Callicott, et al., 1999). By employing a visuospatial or a verbal task to 
compete for the limited resources of working memory, the development of intrusions and 
intentional recall of trauma memories should be disrupted. However, the DRT may 
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oversimplify information processing in SAM and VAM systems.  It argues that 
processing information in the VAM system requires conscious attention, whereas 
processing information in the SAM system requires little attentional capacity (Brewin et 
al., 1996). If this is the case, a visuospatial task in a dual task paradigm should not 
interfere significantly with the development of intrusions in the SAM system, considering 
that processing information in the SAM system does not require much attentionaland 
working memory resources. 
The DRT also fails to account for how other memory processes may influence 
information processing in the SAM and VAM systems. Traditional models of memory 
suggest that information is first held in sensory memory before it is processed in working 
memory (Sherry &Schacter, 1987). Working memory is limited in attentional capacity, so 
not all information from sensory memory can be consciously attended to and processed 
(Engle,Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). However, the DRTsimply proposes that 
verbal information that receives conscious attention is processed in the VAM system, 
whereas visuospatial information that does not require much conscious attention is 
processed in the SAM system(Brewin& Holmes, 2003). In fact, memory that receives 
conscious attention and being processed into working memory consists of both 
visuospatial and verbal content, so does memory that does not require much working 
memory capacity and is less consciously attended to. For instance, research has shown 
that intrusions includesensory-based intrusions and verbal thoughts (Ehlers et al., 2002; 
Murray, Ehlers, &Mayou, 2002). On the other hand, working memory model suggests 
that both visuospatial and verbal information are consciously attended to and processed to 
be stored in two separate systems in working memory (Baddeley, 1996). Even though 
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there are mixed findings as to whether the two systems in working memory are 
independent or associated, researchers have agreed on the two domain-specific systems 
for information processing and storage (e.g., Alloway, Pickering, &Gathercole, 2006; 
Friedman & Miyake, 2000; Kane et al., 2004). Therefore, a visuospatial task does not 
necessarily interrupt the development of intrusions which actually consist of visuospatial 
and verbal information, and a verbal task does not necessarily interrupt the development 
of intentional recall of trauma memory which consists of information being processed in 
both visuospatial and verbal systems. Accordingly, examinations of the DRT have 
yielded mixed results when intrusions are only treated as visuospatial information being 
less consciously processed and intentional recall of trauma memory as verbal information 
being more consciously processed.  
The DRT also proposes that intrusions can be re-encoded from the SAM into the 
VAM system if the individual pays attention to the content (Brewin& Holmes, 2003).
Doing so allows the content in VAM to be deliberately retrieved and verbally 
communicated. However, this view is problematic because transferring information 
between the SAM and the VAM systems is not an automatic process, it also involves the 
central executive in working memory to control and manipulate information processing 
in the two systems. Therefore, the simplified information processing of traumatic 
eventsproposed by the DRTmakes it more difficult to understand the completeprocess of 
the development of intrusions and the way of reducing intrusions. In fact, re-experiencing 
the intrusive memories could help with integration of fragmentary memory into the 
intentional memory of the traumatic event (Jacobs&Nadel, 1998). However, people with 
PTSD are not able to put intrusions into context, and to access corrective information that 
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may minimize the negative effects of intrusions (Koriat, Goldsmith &Pansky, 2000). 
Therefore, the difficulty PTSD patients have is in assigning a complete temporal and 
spatial context to intrusions and integrating fragmented and isolated intrusions into 
intentional recall of trauma memories(Ehlers et al., 2004). Moreover, relative to controls, 
PTSD patients showed reduction in both right and left hippocampal volume (Buckley, 
Blanchard, & Neill, 2000), which plays an important role in binding item and contextual
information (Diana, Yonelinas, &Ranganath, 2007). Therefore, PTSD patients seem to 
lack the ability of bringing intrusions into awareness and binding intrusions and 
contextual information. This ability requires the central executive in working memoryto 
assign limited attentional resources. However, the DRT only focused on information 
processing within and between the SAM and VAM systems, without considering the 
coordination function of the higher order executive in working memory.
Another limitation of the DRT is that it proposes that perceptual information 
encoded and stored in the SAM system can only be retrieved by situational cues similar 
to those in traumatic events, and verbal information encoded and stored in the VAM 
system can only be retrieved intentionally as required (Brewin& Holmes, 2003). These 
two retrieval processes are actually in accordance with two memory retrieval strategies: 
generative and direct retrieval (Conway &Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). However, the 
distinction between the two is that generative retrieval refers to a top-down and strategic 
retrieval process, whereas direct retrieval is a bottom up process where specific memory 
can be activated by cues in the environment directly (Williams, 2004). Though there is 
more perceptual and sensory information involved in direct retrieval, it does not 
necessarily indicate that the retrieval strategy is dependent on whether the materials 
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retrieved are verbal or visuospatial. For instance, a recent fMRI study found that 
generative retrieval recruited lateral prefrontal and temporal regions early on during the 
retrieval process to support the strategic search, whereas direct retrieval recruited many 
other regions at a later time point (Addis, Knapp, Roberts, &Schacter, 2012). Therefore, 
the critical difference between the two retrieval processesis that generative retrieval 
requires effortful memory search. It is highly possible to have inconsistent findings when 
the DRT simply regards visuospatial information as retrieved involuntarily and verbal 
information as retrieved intentionally. 
Moreover, classic models conceptualize memory processes in three separate 
stages: encoding, storage and consolidation, and retrieval (Tulving, 1983). However, the 
DRT did not clearly describe information processing in all the three stages, and did not 
distinguish how traumatic memory is processed differently between the three stages. 
According to the DRT, the storage and consolidation stage is critical in the development 
of the traumatic memory. Employment of a cognitive task is intended to disrupt 
information processing in this stage. However, encoding success can only be estimated 
on the basis of retrieval performance (Blanchet et al., 2001). The effect of different 
cognitive tasks isonly reflected in how trauma-related memory can be retrieved later. In 
fact, the relationship between encoding and retrieval has not been fully investigated in 
memory literature. Even though some prior neuroimaging studies have indicated that 
brain regions that were activated during encoding are reactivated during retrieval, there 
are some other regions involved in only one of these stages (Kent & Lamberts, 2008). For 
instance, one study found that encoding and consolidation are dependent on the 
hippocampus, but retrieval is also mediated by the prefrontal cortex (Simons &Spiers, 
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2003). Therefore, the effects of cognitive task examined in retrieval stage do not only 
reflect how traumatic memory is disrupted in storage and consolidation stage. The 
number of intrusions over one-week period and intentional memory recall is also 
influenced by information processing in other stages, such as encoding and retrieval 
respectively.
Furthermore, the DRT did not consider the effects of other factors which may 
affect encoding and retrieval, as well as visuospatial and verbal memory differently. 
These confounding factors also make it difficult to understand the effects of different 
cognitive tasks on intrusions and intentional memory recall. For example, one study 
found that stress facilitated consolidation of visuospatial information (Cahill, Gorski, & 
Le, 2003), whereas another study showed that stress impaired retrieval of verbal 
information (Kuhlmann, Piel, & Wolf, 2005). Nairne (2002) suggested that the match 
between encoding and retrieval helps the performance on retrieval, such as the conditions 
where the stimuli are presented. 
To sum up, the DRT oversimplified information processing in traumatic memory. 
The DRT regards intrusions mainly include visuospatial information that does not require 
much attentional capacity, whereas intentional recall of trauma memory mainly consists 
of verbal information that requires being consciously processed. The DRT also ignored 
the coordination and manipulation function of the higher order executive in working 
memory, but only focused on information processing in lower-order systems – SAM and 
VAM. Moreover, the DRT did not consider information processing in encoding, storage 
and consolidation, and retrieval stages and factors that may affect these stages differently, 
but only focused on storage and consolidation stage. These limitations of the DRT may 
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partially explain mixed findings examining hypotheses generated from the DRT. 
Therefore, more research is needed to establish a more comprehensive model to better 
understand the development of traumatic memory, and to help reduce intrusions and 
other PTSD symptoms.
In the present study, exploratory analyses werealso conducted to examine the 
associations between various individual differences and PTSDsymptoms across 
conditions. Consistent with previous research (Berenz, Vujanovic, Coffey &Zvolensky, 
2012; Collimore, McCabe, Carleton &Asmundson, 2008), the findings of Study 1 and 
Study 2 revealed positive relationships between anxiety sensitivity and PTSD symptoms, 
even after controlling for depression and trait anxiety.Anxiety sensitivity, the fear of 
physical sensations based on the perceptions that these sensations have harmful 
consequence (Reiss & McNally, 1985), has been implicated as a risk factor for 
PTSD(Olatunji&Wolitzky-Taylor, 2009). Although prior research has observed
associations between anxiety sensitivity and PTSD symptom severity, especially 
avoidance and hyperarousal (Berenz et al., 2012; Bernsteinet al., 2005), few studies have 
directly examined the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and trauma-related 
memory. Study 1 found that the physical concerns subscale of anxiety sensitivity was 
positively correlated with intrusions and negatively correlated with intentional memory 
recall. This finding suggests that the fear of physical sensations contribute to the 
development of more intrusions but result in worse intentional memory recall. Study
2found a positive relation between physical concerns and sensory-based intrusions
reported in Study 1, but did not replicate the negative relation between physical concerns 
and intentional memory recall. This overall pattern of results indicates that fear of 
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physical sensations may predict traumatic intrusions, but its relationship with intentional 
memory recall requires further investigation.
Although the present findings suggest that prior evidence that engagement in 
visuospatial tasks reduces trauma intrusions may not be robust, various limitations should 
be noted. In Study 1, the visuospatial task and verbal task were matched in subjective 
ratings of difficulty and engagement. However, common cognitive load assessment 
consists of performance on a task, subjective and physiological measures (Cegarra& 
Chevalier, 2008).A more comprehensive assessment could be conducted to better match 
cognitive tasks in terms of cognitive load. Furthermore, the Recognition Memory Test 
was constructed to assess intentional memory recall of the specific trauma film in the 
present study. The psychometric properties and validity of this measurement has not been 
examined in a large population. Though the preliminary analyses in the present study 
provided initial support, indicated by high inter-rater reliability, the utility of this test 
requires to be explored with more comprehensive methods.
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